The law and economics debate about the desirability of prohibiting insider trading – trading by corporate insiders on material, non-public information – is both longstanding and unresolved. The early legal debate centred on whether insider trading is unfair to public investors who are not privy to private corporate information. However, the fairness inquiry was malleable, lacked a rigorous theoretical framework, and therefore did not yield coherent or practical policy prescriptions. Professor Henry Manne abruptly shifted the debate to an efficiency inquiry with his now classic 1966 book, Insider Trading and the Stock Market. In Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Manne argued that, contrary to the prevailing legal and moral opinion of the time, insider trading is desirable because it is economically efficient. Manne’s controversial thesis abruptly shifted the focus from fairness to the economics of insider trading and precipitated an intense debate in the law and economics literature about the efficiency implications of insider trading. The central question in the law and economics debate is whether insider trading is economically inefficient and thus ought to be subject to government regulation or, conversely, whether it is economically efficient and thus ought not to be regulated. Law and economics scholars sit on both sides of the fence. Some even straddle the fence, for example, by arguing that even if insider trading might be inefficient (bad) for some firms it might be efficient (good) for other firms and therefore the law should enable corporations and shareholders to address insider trading via private contract, on a case by case basis. Without question, the law and economics approach has advanced the legal policy debate about insider trading, but it has not achieved consensus on fundamental questions.
Law and economics theories about insider trading fall into two main categories: agency theories and market theories of insider trading. Agency theories of insider trading analyze its effect on the classic corporate agency problem, the manager shareholder conflict of interest. These theories consider whether insider trading ameliorates or worsens this conflict, and therefore whether it increases or reduces firm level efficiency. In contrast, market theories of insider trading address its broader ramifications for market efficiency.
Agency theories of insider trading analyze the effects of insider trading on agency costs. If insider trading reduces the divergence between shareholders’ and managers’ interests, then it reduces agency costs. Conversely, if insider trading increases this divergence, it increases agency costs. Proponents of unregulated insider trading argue that the former is true, while proponents of insider trading regulation opt for the latter.
Mechanism In Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Professor Manne argues that insider trading is economically efficient because it motivates entrepreneurial innovation. According to Manne, it is difficult to compensate entrepreneurs because, unlike capitalists and salaried employees, it is hard to identify entrepreneurs in advance. Because anyone from regular salaried employees to top executives may generate profitable innovations, it is difficult to set entrepreneurs’ pay in advance. Moreover, the value of entrepreneurial activity will be vague at the outset: True innovation cannot be predicted nor its value known before it has been thought of and made effective. True innovation cannot be planned and budgeted in advance. An individual cannot be hired to perform x amount of entrepreneurial service.
Finally, so the argument goes, the dynamic nature of innovation renders it virtually impossible to contract over in advance.
Insider trading is seen as a mechanism to avoid the inefficiencies that these conditions would otherwise produce. Through insider trading, entrepreneurs can be rewarded in direct proportion to & contemporaneously with their innovations. Entrepreneurial innovation creates valuable new information (at the most basic level, that there has been an innovation) and the first person to know about it is the entrepreneur who produced the innovation. She can profit by buying the company’s shares before the public learns of the innovation and before their value rises to reflect the positive news. Even if the entrepreneur is wealth-constrained and thus cannot buy unlimited shares, she can “sell” this information to others. In this manner, insider trading “readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their innovations,” thus forging a closer link between entrepreneurial compensation and innovation. Since it maximizes their incentives to innovate, insider trading is the best way to compensate entrepreneurs.
Professors Carlton and Fischel recast Manne’s efficient compensation thesis in the language of the economics of agency. They argue that insider trading is efficient because it reduces agency costs. In their view, relying on capital and product markets to properly incentivize managers is insufficient because these markets work imperfectly, making it relatively difficult to remove poorly performing managers. Ex ante compensation contracts are inadequate because they would require costly “periodic renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed effort and output.” In contrast, insider trading enables managers continually to update their compensation in light of new information without incurring renegotiation costs. Insider trading thus increases mangers’ incentives by linking their “fortunes more closely to those of the firm.”
In addition, Professors Carlton and Fischel claim, insider trading improves the managerial labor market:
A related advantage of insider trading is that it provides firms with valuable information concerning prospective managers. It is difficult for firms to identify those prospective managers who will work hard and not be overly risk averse in their choice of investment projects. Basing compensation in part on insider trading is one method for sorting superior from inferior managers. Because insider trading rewards those managers who create valuable information and are willing to take risks, managers who most prefer such compensation schemes may be those who are the least risk averse and the most capable.
Because the ability to engage in insider trading causes the most able managers to self select into firms that allow it, insider trading reduces both screening and monitoring costs. Lower screening and monitoring costs imply lower agency costs, a central concern of corporate law.
Proponents of insider trading regulation emphasize its rent-extraction potential, suggesting that insider trading might simply be an inefficient private benefit of control that accrues to managers and other insiders at shareholders’ expense. They argue that rather than serving as an incentive-alignment device that more closely aligns shareholders’ and manager’s interests, insider trading can exacerbate agency costs by distorting the managerial wage-setting process. If they are permitted to trade, managers might be able ex post to undo an efficient ex ante compensation contract and thereby sabotage performance-based compensation schemes intended to calibrate pay to productivity. As a result, firms might have to monitor managers’ trading ex post, offsetting its presumed cost saving to the firm.
In addition, some proponents regulation argue that in practice it is difficult to ensure that those who produce valuable information (i.e., entrepreneurial innovations) are the only ones who are able to profit from it. This non-excludability feature of insider trading benefits could generate a free-rider problem and possibly lead to information hoarding within the firm as the true entrepreneurs, who are the real innovators in the firm, would have an incentive to hold their information close to their chests in order to maintain a monopoly on insider trading profits. The inability of the firm’s true entrepreneurs to monopolize the information about their innovations vis-à-vis other insiders might ultimately reduce the incentive to innovate and therefore negatively affect corporate performance. In addition, by obstructing the free flow of information through the firm, such information hoarding could reduce the firm’s overall organizational efficiency.
Proponents of insider trading legislation also claim that allowing managers to trade on inside information might give them incentives to take on too much risk or to undertake value-reducing projects. Since insider trading is more profitable the more volatile are stock prices, it might encourage managers to engage in excessively risky investment behaviour by undertaking overly risky projects that create private opportunities for profitable insider trading but that reduce corporate value for the firm. In addition, since managers can profit from insider trading whether the firm is performing poorly or well, insider trading increases managers’ incentives to under-perform by making them indifferent between whether the firm is doing well or poorly.
If corporate insiders are permitted to sell the firm’s shares short, the potential problems of excessive risk-taking and compensation unbundling induced by insider trading may be exacerbated. Professor Klock gives a colourful and somewhat humorous example:
A case in point is that of Mr. Albert Wiggin, as told by Professor Malkiel. Mr Wiggin was, [t]he head of Chase, the nation’s second largest bank at the time. In July 1929 Mr. Wiggin became apprehensive about the dizzy heights to which stocks had climbed and no longer felt comfortable speculating on the bull side of the market….Believing that the prospects of his own bank’s stock were particularly dim…he sold short over 42,000 shares of Chase stock….
Wiggin’s timing was perfect. Immediately after the short sale the price of Chase stock began to fall, and when the crash came in the fall the stock dropped precipitously. When the account was closed in November, Mr. Wiggin had netted a multimillion dollar profit from the operation….
There are two possible interpretations of the Wiggin case. One is that Mr. Wiggin believed bad news was inevitable and sold short. He then worked vigorously against his own self interest trying to minimize his profit, and even trying to lose his personal wealth, but nevertheless managed to make a great deal of money in spite of his best efforts to the contrary….The alternative is that there is some self-dealing going on. Readers are left to determine for themselves the more probable explanation.
The law and economics literature on insider trading is plagued by a few significant shortcomings. Like the fairness inquiry, the efficiency inquiry is rather elusive, as no single locus of efficiency focuses the scholarly debate. Rather, the investigations vary from an examinations of the narrow effects of insider trading on efficiency at the firm level (agency theories of insider trading) to work studying the broader effects of insider trading on stock market efficiency (market theories of insider trading). It is possible, for example, that insider trading may enhance efficiency within the firm, but that markets in which insider trading is permitted are thereby less efficient in the aggregate. Researchers who focus their studies at different levels and report different results could be talking past each other. A second, major deficiency of the law and economics literature on insider trading is that it is insufficiently grounded in empirical evidence, although, as Professors Carlton and Fischel note, the “desirability of [regulating] insider trading is ultimately an empirical question.” Rather, beginning with Manne’s seminal argument, law and economics scholarship on insider trading has been largely speculative and theoretical. Finally, also until recently, the existing empirical literature on insider trading has been American-centred. Few scholars have sought to examine the impact of insider trading rules in a comparative context. This is important because without variation in insider trading rules, one cannot test causal hypotheses.
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