DEFINING MEASURING AND DETECTING ELECTION FRAUD

It will become clear to the reader that there are a number of competing definitions of election fraud. Even scholars who are at the forefront of research on election fraud do not agree on a general conceptual definition. We are discussing the issue where we delineate the steps that we view as essential in working toward a stronger body of research on election fraud and in improving public policies for the detection and prevention of election fraud.

The election fraud includes research informed by elections in dozens of countries. It was motivated primarily by a desire to systematically evaluate the heightened attention to claims of election fraud in the United States since the controversial 2000 presidential election. These claims and much of the literature on election fraud in both domestic and international contexts is a theoretical and anecdotal, designed to make a specific case about election fraud or give examples about the continuity of fraud cases over time. Such works are helpful to the overall understanding of election fraud, but have been most useful in documenting the historical occurrences of fraud.

We are interested in developing a more comprehensive framework for examining election fraud. In many ways, the election fraud problem is similar to many “black box” problems. Elections have inputs (voters, parties, candidates, the media) and outputs (the vote share for each competitor). In the middle there is a process that is not inherently transparent. The secret ballot minimizes voter coercion by ensuring that a given vote cannot be attributed to a given voter. However, it also means that the election process is not auditable in the same way that a banking system is auditable. The procedures that govern the election can also make the process more or less transparent and more or less open to public scrutiny.

Given that we can never truly measure whether each voter’s intention was successfully transmitted through the electoral process, one can examines the array of potentially illegal or unfair inputs and outputs of the electoral process. This requires defining the electoral process and the bounds for legal and illegal election activities. Next, given that the electoral process can be viewed as a black box problem, we are also interested in examining techniques that can be employed to determine whether the activities that occurred “inside” the black box are outside the bounds of what we would expect in a democratic election. Finally, we consider how to make an election free and fair through procedural and legal measures.

Research on election fraud, both in the United States and internationally, is difficult. Even in a purely legal sense, definitions of election fraud differ widely in different jurisdictions. Comparatively, activities viewed as normal behaviour during elections in the United States would be considered fraud in other countries. Even in the United States, acceptable actions in one state may be explicitly banned in others. The relative nature of election fraud and the widely variant historical, cultural, and institutional contexts in which election fraud has occurred make the development of a clear and consistent definition a complicated, if not impossible, undertaking. In this research and investigation, we examine understandings of election fraud, focusing primarily on legal definitions of fraud. Even within the rather narrow United States legal context, federal and state laws differ, and case law continues to contribute new information. New voting technologies have generated new legal challenges, and some questionable practices remain untested within the judicial system. The chapter by Craig Donsanto provides a helpful legal framework for understanding United States federal election laws and the activities that are considered election fraud. Donsanto cuts through the legalese to explain what is actually outlawed in United States elections. Tellingly, we again see here that definitions of election fraud, as established by the courts, have evolved over time, and Congress has worked to tune the laws related to election fraud for more than 100 years.

One of the more vital consequences of election fraud may be the negative effect it has on public confidence in the electoral process. This consequence may occur even when no election fraud actually takes place. Simple allegations of fraud can be enough to depress citizen participation and harm the reputation of the institutions charged with administering elections. Such allegations also give politicians the ability to offer reforms, which may serve either to improve elections or to entrench some bias in the electoral system. With this in mind, Thad Hall and Tova Wang examine what might be learned from the international democracy promotion community about normative principles for the prevention of election fraud. Although not law, these documents may provide guidance to those interested in applying lessons from abroad in the United States context.

A looming unknown question is whether efforts to reduce election fraud through prevention, deterrence, or detection are analogous to plugging a small hole in a leaky dam or throwing a boulder in the middle of a river. In other words, do efforts to prevent or deter election fraud actually eliminate it or do they merely displace it? In some contexts, particularly in the more undemocratic settings, persons planning to engage in election fraud will simply circumvent any barriers put in their way. In other cases, it is possible that only minor reforms could eliminate fraudulent practices altogether.

Through case studies of Iraqi and Palestinian elections, Gamze Çavdar shows how procedurally acceptable elections may be affected by the broader context, specifically when elections take place under foreign occupation. Given the lively current debate about the importance of transitioning to democratic elections in the Middle East, Çavdar’s chapter provides important theoretical analysis of the issues that must be considered as countries move to democratic elections.

Measuring Election Fraud

Debates about election reform and proposed changes to election procedures are generally infused with questions about election fraud. For example, following the 2000 United States presidential election, when debate began over the legislation that became the “Help America Vote Act,” significant attention was paid to the question of whether the voter registration process in some states invited certain forms of election fraud. In recent years, as many states have moved toward stricter voter identification procedures, the rationale for stricter identification requirements has been that they will prevent voter fraud. Some experts have criticized these debates, arguing that there is little empirical evidence documenting widespread election fraud, at least of the sort that stricter voter identification requirements would prevent.

This empirical debate is quite important because, if fraud is a problem, we should be able to see evidence of it in legal proceedings and in data from elections. The debate over fraud requires having some baseline data on the types of fraud that occur, the frequency of these various types of fraud, the types of individuals who perpetrate fraud, and the rationale for committing fraud. Given the mostly anecdotal nature of the debate over fraud, any effort to systematically collect and analyze data on election fraud—at the federal, state, or local level—moves the study of election fraud forward. To use an analogy, are fraud accusations like aeroplane crashes—infrequent but focusing events that we remember; or are accusations of fraud more like car accidents, events that occur frequently but where only the most dramatic make the news?

A seemingly simple yet vexing question: how much election fraud is there? This part focuses on measuring election fraud in the United States; we would encourage readers to examine chapter, by Mikhail Myagkov, Peter Ordeshook, and Dimitry Shaikin, to appreciate the issues associated with fraud in the post-Soviet context. We start this part with attitudinal data regarding election fraud; Michael Alvarez and Thad Hall take readers on a tour of these perceptions, discussing how both the elite and the general population view fraud. Unlike many discussions of election fraud, they ground this discussion in a theoretical framework of risk assessment and how risk is communicated and amplified through society. The survey data presented by the Authority allow us to see how Americans perceive fraud and what types of fraud are most worrisome to the general public.

Delia Bailey looks at the record of federal election fraud litigation to examine how many cases have been brought into the national court system, what types of fraud have been alleged, and how extensive the election fraud might have been. Given the political debate in Washington in 2007 regarding the role of United States attorneys in prioritizing voting fraud prosecutions, the findings in this cases shed important light on the prosecution of federal election fraud. Michael Alvarez and Frederick Boehmke examine records of fraud allegation from California and Georgia in order to document the rates of different forms of election fraud. The systematic examination of election fraud at the state level provides a baseline for understanding the frequency with which fraud is actually prosecuted as well as evidence of the types of fraud that occur.

Roderick Kiewiet, Thad Hall, Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Katz consider a simple but potentially powerful methodology for finding problems in a given jurisdiction’s elections: asking the local elections administrators to fill out “incident reports.”Using these incident reports from a recent election in Ohio, Kiewiet and his colleagues are able to document a number of potential points of failure and some important procedural vulnerabilities. These data provide insights both into the types of administrative problems that occur in elections as well as the types of fraud that can occur if simple procedures for election security are not followed. Finally, Todd Donovan and Daniel Smith present and analyze new data on signature fraud in ballot measure petitions. Given the growing number of ballot initiatives in many United States and the role that they can play in setting the policy agenda, understanding how fraud is perpetrated in the signature collection process, its frequency, and the effectiveness of efforts to ameliorate this problem are critical in evaluating direct democracy.

Detecting election fraud can be a difficult task. Except in cases of blatant fraud—such as the case examined by Mikhail Myagkov, Peter Ordeshook, and Dimitry Shaikin in their chapter on Russia—it can be difficult to distinguish between blatant attempts to manipulate the election and isolated anomalies, incidents, or irregularities that may be completely unintentional. Many methods of detecting election fraud require a transparent electoral process and high quality data reported in a timely manner. Detection also requires knowing where to look for election manipulation. For example, fraud is a more cost effective activity in an election where only a small number of stolen votes are needed to change the outcome of a race. Local races and very close elections are often the places to look for fraud within relatively democratic contexts.

The 2000 United States presidential election and the subsequent attention paid to observed electoral irregularities in that election (especially in Florida) generated renewed interest in the United States in studying electoral irregularities and fraud. The problem with such research is that it is often predicated on suppositions or assumptions that may have little to do with fraud. The 2004 election was rife with allegations not necessarily founded on evidence; the New York Times even printed a story about conspiracy theories on the Internet, including allegations that optical scan balloting was the source of fraud in Florida, and that long lines in Ohio were a sure sign of fraud there. These studies often failed to consider basic, well-established, information about party identification, bipartisan election administration, and statistics. For example, the New York Times article quotes Clay Shirky of the interactive telecommunications program at New York University, who suggests “that the online fact-finding machine has come unmoored, and that some bloggers simply can’t imagine any universe in which a fair count of the votes would result in George Bush being re-elected president.”

Addressing the question of election fairness requires models of elections that allow researchers to determine if election outcomes look like what we would expect in a fair election. There is growing interest in using sophisticated statistical or econometric techniques to model election regularities— and to then identify election irregularities, or “outliers.” Detected outliers, say in precinct-by-precinct or county-by-county analyses, can then be examined in further detail to determine if their outlier status is due to fraud or to other benign or idiosyncratic factors.

This is a promising avenue for future studies of election fraud. A different method to answer the same question: were the data that were produced by the election—the vote totals, turnout, and the like—what we would expect in a democratic election? The several different statistical methodologies that can be used to look for anomalies and problems in elections and election administration— results that might provide a priori evidence for further investigation of potential election fraud.

An analysis by Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Katz, who examine the 2002 gubernatorial and senatorial elections in Georgia in which problems were alleged. Alvarez and Katz show that the combination of political science knowledge of elections and simple but powerful statistical tools can be used to look for anomalies in county-level data. Using historical data and regression analysis, they show how it is possible to determine whether a given election outcome is within the bounds of what would be predicted by previous events. Walter Mebane modifies the use of Benford’s Law—a statistical technique that was originally developed to detect financial fraud—to examine election fraud. This little-known but potentially powerful test can be used to study the distribution of election returns across geographic units and test whether they differ from expected patterns. He has applied this technique to both domestic and international election data and shows how Benford’s Law not only identifies traditional localities with a history of fraud but also identifies localities that have been the centre of election controversies.

Mikhail Myagkov, Peter Ordeshook, and Dimitry Shaikin use data from recent elections in Russia and a “flow of votes” analysis to look for evidence of anomalies and potential manipulation. Susan Hyde considers how international election observation can detect and deter election fraud and advocates random assignment of observers as an improvement to existing methodology.

We propose a series of simple reforms that could be put into place to detect and prevent election fraud. Even where the probability of election fraud is low, doubts surrounding the legitimacy and fairness of an electoral process should still compel strong public policy action. Low voter confidence in an electoral process, even if unfounded, can have a depressing effect on turnout and other civic action. Therefore, we argue that policymakers in the world should enact reforms that are likely to increase voter trust and confidence in the electoral process. Given persistent suspicions about the integrity of elections, steps should be taken to ensure that the public—not just the insular world of election officials and political parties—is confident that elections are free and fair, and that their outcomes are accurate.

Our first recommendation is that elections, especially each country elections— should be made more transparent to observation by impartial and nonpartisan observers. In most states, the role of election observation has been delegated to political parties. Although this is helpful, parties are not neutral observers; they want to ensure that their own voters get to vote but are likely to be indifferent, or even hostile, to voters from other parties. States should adopt laws that allow for neutral organizations to observe voting in order to signal that the elections are being conducted in a free and fair manner. An additional benefit of such observation is that scholars and interested students of elections will gain access to information about the mechanics of voting operations at polling places and thus study the efficacy of election administration practices that relate to election fraud prevention. Presently, lack of access by nonpartisan observers to a diverse sample of polling stations is one of the barriers to scholarly evaluation of election administration.

Second, election officials should report more data in real time. The basic data on elections—how many voters were eligible to vote in each precinct, how many voters voted, and the vote totals for each race—are needed for a transparent electoral process and for some methods of fraud detection. We understand that this recommendation may require significant upgrading of the technical infrastructure in many counties. Many of the most powerful techniques for fraud detection, identified in this volume, require access to precinct-level election results. Many other countries, including developing democracies, already compile and release precinct-level election results. Proper analysis of those results may be one of the best ways to deter fraud, and greater transparency is likely to increase voter confidence in the electoral process. It would be ideal if these data could be reported electronically, in a common format. Even without this reform, better reporting of existing data would improve our ability to analyze them.

Finally, we also strongly urge our colleagues—and the public and private organizations that fund their research—to expand the research literature on election fraud. As scholars, we need to develop new ways to study election fraud, we need new publication outlets for academic research on a question that is inherently multidisciplinary and methodologically complex, and we need to develop theoretical approaches for defining and understanding what we mean by election fraud, when it might occur, and how it might be perpetrated. These are tall orders, but we are hopeful that the collection of ideas in this volume will spark interest in what we see as a potentially exciting new field for new social science research. 

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