The seemingly unstoppable growth of regional organizations, since the end of the Cold War, has been one of the defining characteristics of the current international system. Throughout this period, regionalism has taken many forms and shapes, varying from tiny associations that include no more than a few actors and focus on a single issue, to huge continental-unions that address a multitude of common problems from territorial defense to food security. Far from being solely state-led undertakings, regional organizations have also come to include a variety of actors from civil society and NGOs to private businesses and interest groups. Together, these actors engage in common problem solving that has become an indispensable part of the current international system. Regionalism, in other words, has become a mainstay of global governance, contributing in a myriad of different ways to the solving of emerging transnational issues.
With the emergence of a multipolar world order, global governance structures are facing a number of important challenges. These challenges relate to the difficulties of adapting existing global governance structures to the emergence of a number of new global players, each eager to have a bigger say in international affairs. Most commonly, it is assumed that these developments will contribute to a weakening of multilateral institutions and lead to the development of new global governance structures.
Some far-reaching arguments are suggesting that the recent move towards a multipolar world order is casting a shadow over the development of global governance. The increasing number of major states makes it more difficult to realize common global interests and absolute gains. Moreover, the ongoing transition of power has made it more difficult for the United States Of America(USA) and European Union(EU) to lead the way and strike global deals. No one power is in a position to set up global governance structures and institutions or assure their functioning. The shift towards a multipolar order is therefore associated with (i) relative gains and traditional power politics rather than common interests and global governance; and (ii) fragmentation resulting from the decentralization of economic and political power.
These arguments are supported by the failure of the multilateral global governance framework to address global challenges and crises as well as the continuing salience of the state sovereignty and states’ hesitance to implement existing and establish new binding global arrangements. Frequently mentioned examples include the failure of the United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change(UNFCC) process, difficulties in expanding trade liberalization within the World Trade Organization(WTO) framework, the reluctance of major powers to join the International Court of Justice (ICJ), heated debate on the principle of the “ Responsibility to Protect ” and the more recent disagreements on financial (re-)regulation and macroeconomic imbalances amongst the big powers.
While the suggested turn towards multipolarity and power politics is in many ways connected to the global financial and economic crisis, it clearly pre-dates the current crisis. Since the mid-2000s analysts have suggested that the developed economies in the West have lost their faith in globalization. Faced with an intensifying global competition – transfer of investments and jobs to the emerging economies – the absolute gains that derive from globalization have been questioned in Washington and many European Union(EU) capitals. There has also been a populist turn against the consequences of economic globalization and the kind of open society it implies in many of the developed countries in Europe. The financial and economic crisis has further emphasized these trends, as many of the major developing economies have come out from the crisis with substantial growth rates, while the United States Of America(USA) and most European countries are still struggling financially and economically.
The economic growth rates of the major developing powers have also translated intoclaims for greater representation in global governance institutions. The emerging powers ability and willingness to promote further globalization and global governance is however unclear. These countries have tended to highlight the developing nature of their economies and societies; many have emphasized the need to protect their economies from global competition. Similarly, while emerging powers have claimed fairer representation in global governance institutions, they seem to shy away from the burden-sharing and global responsibility called upon by the Western powers, as pertains for example to the United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change(UNFCC) negotiations.
The state or a renaissance of great power politics, corresponds only partially with real world developments. The world economy and global politics – and indeed the present and looming crisis – are characterized by an unprecedented degree of interdependence. Recent developments also suggest that global governance is increasing rather than decreasing. States and other actors are progressively attempting to find common solutions to common challenges and coordinating joint action within more or less institutionalized global and regional forums. Indeed, many of the above mentioned examples can also be taken as examples of a progressively expanding joint global agenda and governance.
Moreover, there is evidence suggesting an increasing commitment to multilateralism as a basic organizing principle of global governance. The current United States Of America(USA) administration’s aspirations to foster multilateralism have been widely welcomed by many – in particular by the European Union(EU) – after a distinctly unilateralist period of United States Of America(USA) foreign policy. Moreover, the streamlining of the European Union’s external relations is likely to make its strategic aims – including advancing effective multilateralism – more visible and important in global governance. Significantly, also China has committed itself to multilateral cooperation and some have suggested that it has become a prominent feature of its foreign policy.
In the light of the above, a more appropriate description for the current trends in world politics is a shift towards an inter polar global order. Inter polarity, as introduced by Giovanni Grevi (Giovanni Grevi is a senior fellow at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance), suggests that the ongoing transformation of world order is characterized by both an increasing multipolarity (understood as increasing number of major states with regional and global reach) as well as growing interdependency among these states. Grevi argues that too often these two processes are consider as separate, or even opposing, developments. It is suggested here that bridging these processes enables us to generate a fuller picture of the current environment shaping global governance.
The ‘crisis of multilateralism’ has been discussed widely among scholars and policy-makers. So far the debate suggests that the core problem is systemic and rooted in a mismatch between multilateral organizations founded to serve and protect sovereign states and the intensifying number of global challenges that transcend the interests and borders of individual states. As a result, many of the traditional multilateral arrangements and institutions are under review. Reforming multilateral frameworks has however proved difficult mainly for two reasons: (i) the distinctively unilateralist period of the United States of America(USA) foreign policy during the previous administration and (ii) the increasing multipolarity during the current administration.
Given the problems associated with the traditional multilateral framework represented by the United Nations system and its institutions, more informal varieties of multilateral cooperation – such as the G8 and G20 – have taken a front seat in global governance. In particular the G20 seems to be symptomatic for managing global governance in an inter polar world.
The development of this forum has been crisis driven. It was set up at a ministerial and central bank chief executive level in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and upgraded to the head of state and government level in the 2000s in the midst of the global financial and economic crisis. The group was seen as necessary to forge cooperation and joint global action to deal with the crisis and increasing economic interdependence. As such, its formation points towards weaknesses of the established multilateral global governance system. Indeed, one of the key features of the G20 agenda is global governance reform. While its official agenda has mainly dealt with financial and economic governance issues, debates surrounding the G20 have also addressed the future of the other multilateral arrangements such as the United Nations system. The G20 cooperation also reflects the changing realities of the global balance of power. The forum includes the major emerging economies, and it has been seen to consolidate their importance.
Some analysts, such as Risto Penttilä, argue that recent developments including the emergence of the G20 represent a watered-down form of multilateralism: ‘multilateralism light’. In his view, the world has moved into a dual system of global governance. This system consists of formal and informal international organizations. Whereas the informal ones are increasingly responsible for solving acute crisis and problems, the formal ones concentrate on implementing the output of the informal ones. This includes making concrete choices and legally-binding decisions in a legitimate way.
In terms of efficiency, ‘multilateralism light’ sounds like a tempting option. According to Penttilä it might prove to be a ‘healthier’ option for global governance. It could enable states to ‘curb the empty carbs’ from the diet of fat and slow organizations and streamline at least some of the multilateral institutions, which are increasingly seen to be inefficient. Similarly, other scholars have become increasingly interested in the G20’s ability to foster reforms of the multilateral global governance institutions.
However, just as we are uncertain about the ‘health effects’ of the substitutes used in ‘light consumer products’, we are not fully aware of the consequences of this lighter multilateralism either. Although it might taste the same, its impact on the complex global governance system remains unclear and requires to be put under closer analytical scrutiny.
Several observers have voiced questions when it comes to the current ‘G-trend’ in global governance. Laura Tedesco and Richard Youngs have labeled the G20 as a potentially ‘dangerous multilateralism’. In their analysis, the G20 is seen as a new forum with old voices (understood as great power interests) and hence deeply harmful to traditional multilateralism and good global governance. The reasons for their skepticism include the groups’ lack of transparency and public accountability as well as its exclusiveness as a forum of the major economic powers.
As an informal forum its decisions are taken behind closed doors and there exist no treaty based on commonly agreed principles of conduct or access to information. Although the group’s membership is significantly larger than the G8 and more representative of world opinion, it is not open to the majority of the stakeholders. Tedesco and Youngs illustrate their skepticism by considering the G20’s aim to fight against protectionism. While the group has (until recently) been seen as highly successful in keeping the markets open, nothing agreed so far suggests that
the forum will be capable of putting pressure on the European Union(EU) and the United States of America(USA) to temper their turn to protectionism. Consequently, the group can be seen as a useful tool for the developed powers to secure their access to the major emerging markets. Tedesco and Youngs ponder whether the “G20 will ultimately be less a facilitator of more effective multilateralism than a distortion of this principle in favour of what is little more than a re-jigged “great powers” format”.
Against this background the G20 can be seen as example of ‘à la carte multilateralism’, a term coined by Richard Haass. Here different multilateral organizations and forums are given merely instrumental value for the great powers and their interest-based politics. In the case of the United States of America(USA) foreign policy, there is evidence suggesting that part of its success in enhancing its interests rests on its systemic importance and ability to lead in world politics. The United States of America(USA) can choose the way of action– whether uni-, bi-, or multilateral – depending on which is most beneficial in a given situation. Moreover, the changing nature of multilateralism is partly resulting from the United States of America’ ability to pick and chose those global governance fora that best serve its interests. If the offered menu of global governance institutions and forums does not satisfy its appetite, it is prone to create something new and suitable for its diet. This seems to indicate that global governance in the inter polar order might be increasingly intergovernmental and driven by great power interests.
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