{"id":722,"date":"2026-05-15T20:19:45","date_gmt":"2026-05-15T20:19:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/?p=722"},"modified":"2026-05-15T20:19:46","modified_gmt":"2026-05-15T20:19:46","slug":"international-vote-buying-the-role-of-international-law-and-domestic-approaches-to-bribery-and-election-fraud-part-i","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/2026\/05\/15\/international-vote-buying-the-role-of-international-law-and-domestic-approaches-to-bribery-and-election-fraud-part-i\/","title":{"rendered":"INTERNATIONAL VOTE BUYING: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC\u00a0 APPROACHES TO BRIBERY AND ELECTION FRAUD: PART I<\/span>"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The practice of vote buying is neither rare nor isolated. One might then ask how international law affects the vote-buying market, if indeed it plays any role at all. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those conversant in public international law will appreciate already that most international voting is governed by the principle of \u201cone country, one vote.\u201d This system is the norm in the United Nations (notwithstanding the Security Council veto possessed only by the five permanent members) and is implicit in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (\u201cVCLT\u201d), which governs all aspects of international treaty-making and application.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the exception of some international financial institutions that use a weighted voting system, it is also applied by nearly every other intergovernmental organization in which states vote. The \u201cone country, one vote\u201d principle is, in a sense, the default rule; unless parties agree to adopt a different scheme, Andorra\u2019s vote counts as much as India\u2019s does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What may surprise is that there is no generally applicable norm of international law that prohibits states from selling their votes in international institutions or bars other states from buying them. The United Nations Charter is silent on vote buying in the General Assembly or the Security Council; the bodies\u2019 respective rules of procedure are similarly silent. The United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States denounces \u201cthe use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind,\u201d but contains no explicit reference to vote buying and is, in any case, nonbinding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also doubtful whether vote buying could be considered \u201ccoercion\u201d within the meaning of the Declaration. Although there are several international anticorruption conventions in force\u2014most notably the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (\u201cUNCAC\u201d), concluded in 2003\u2014 they address the behaviour of individual actors, not states per se. For example, the Preamble to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (\u201cUNCAC\u201d) notes the damaging effects of \u201cthe illicit acquisition of personal wealth\u201d; not once does it mention payments into the state treasury. In any case, there is nothing in the mainstream literature to suggest that the UNCAC applies to states qua states. In the absence of a positive norm against international vote buying, one might try to read a prohibition into states\u2019 general obligation of good faith. The practice of vote buying seems, at first glance, to be a \u201cbad faith\u201d use of international voting mechanisms\u2014or so one could argue. However, the concept of good faith entails that \u201c[e]very State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law.\u201d Thus, the duty of good faith cannot independently generate a new norm; it depends upon a pre-existing obligation created by a generally recognized principle or rule. The International Court of Justice (\u201cICJ\u201d) upheld this interpretation in Case Concerning Border and Trans border Armed Actions, stating that \u201c[the principle of good faith] is not in itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise exist.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One might also find an argument for prohibition in the civil law doctrine of \u201cabuse of rights,\u201d which, in the international context, encompasses cases in which \u201ca State exercis[es] a right either in a way which impedes the enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end different from that for which the right was created, to the injury of another State . . . .\u201d However, in the absence of consensus about the proper purpose of international voting rights, the abuse of rights doctrine provides at most a hypothetical line of attack against international vote buying. The issue has never been litigated before the International Court Of Justice(ICJ) or any other prominent international court; accordingly, no such court has ever held that international vote buying or selling does, in fact, constitute an abuse of rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The overall picture, then, is essentially this: vote buying among states is an issue about which international law currently has very little, if anything, to say.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the existing international law provides few obvious starting points for thinking about approaches toward vote buying. And while various international relations theories can offer predictive insights (albeit conflicting ones) as to what drives states, how states behave, and what assumptions international law should adopt, they do not independently supply an answer to the normative question whether international vote buying is good or bad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By contrast, many countries\u2019 domestic legal systems have long regulated or prohibited various forms of vote buying through bribery statutes and election law. The fact that domestic vote buying has already been the object of substantial intellectual effort\u2014both in the legal sense of designing prohibitions and in the scholarly sense of justifying (or opposing) those prohibitions\u2014makes it a useful starting point for assessing its international counterpart.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet this Article\u2019s comparison of international and domestic vote buying is a careful one; it tests, rather than assumes, the validity of the analogy itself. The dual aim is both to suggest considerations that the international legal discourse has overlooked and also to highlight reasons why our domestic intuitions may be untenable in the international context. In employing domestic-level rationales to assess international vote buying, this Article does not purport to exhaust the list of possible normative benchmarks: its purpose is to further the conversation using a familiar and well-examined reference point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even at the domestic level, the issue of vote buying is hardly straightforward. Some practices are clearly illegal, while others are irreproachable; in the middle, a wide range of behaviour exists in uncertain shades of gray. As commonly understood, classic bribery is merely \u201cthe black core of a series of concentric circles representing the degrees of impropriety in official behaviour.\u201d This examines prevailing domestic-level approaches toward acts that might be considered vote buying. Which sorts of practices are illegal, and which are permitted? More importantly\u2014why? This begins by examining the paradigmatic contexts in which vote buying occurs. Next, it sketches out the contours of election fraud and bribery, which are widely criminalized, then compares several \u201cdubious\u201d practices that are in fact legal (at least in some notable jurisdictions). Finally, it concludes by laying out the main rationales that underpin domestic vote-buying prohibitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As voting is a cornerstone of democratic political processes, it is predictably employed in a great many contexts. Citizens vote to elect their governmental representatives; legislators vote on the passage of laws; judges (in panels) vote on the application and interpretation of those laws. In each of these cases, the voting decisions are made with reference to different standards and entail varying notions of accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first and most fundamental form of voting is citizens\u2019 election of representatives to public office. The right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (\u201cICCPR\u201d) and various other human rights instruments, as well as in the domestic laws of democratic countries (indeed, in many less-than-democratic countries, as well). Suffrage is to be universal and equal, and voting is to take place by secret ballot. At the outset, a few features of this arrangement are worth noting. First, universality and equality of suffrage mean that each citizen\u2019s vote counts exactly as much as any other citizen\u2019s does; equality among individuals is therefore a value that the system seeks to uphold. Second, secret balloting serves as a mechanism to shield voters from undue influence\u2014including vote buying. Indeed, in many corrupt jurisdictions the introduction of the secret ballot has spelled the demise of vote buying, since confidentiality necessarily prevents the \u201cbuyers\u201d from verifying that the \u201csellers\u201d (that is, voters) in fact voted for the candidate promised.104 A corollary of secrecy is that individual voters\u2014 unlike elected representatives or judges\u2014are not held accountable for their votes. Each voter is entitled to vote as he or she pleases, solely on his or her own behalf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A second form of voting is the type that occurs in legislatures: representatives vote on the passage of laws. By contrast to the secrecy of citizen voting, legislators\u2019 voting records are public. This transparency is a crucial method of ensuring accountability; representatives are expected to vote on behalf of their constituents or to further the public interest. Although democratic theorists do differ on the question of whom, precisely, elected officials are obliged to represent, the underlying point is that representatives are not free to vote as they please. They must make decisions by reference to some standard apart from their own personal preference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A third, less obvious form of voting is judicial decision-making. Of course, the \u201cvoting\u201d aspect of judicial decision making is most apparent with juries, or when cases are heard before a panel of judges and the outcome is determined by a \u201cmajority prevails\u201d rule. When a case is heard before a single judge, there is only one \u201cvote\u201d being cast; a one-vote majority bears less obvious resemblance to our traditional conceptions of voting. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article, it will be useful to consider even this latter sort of judicial decision making as falling within a voting paradigm. Like elected representatives, jurors and judges are not free to vote however they wish; they are constrained by the law and the facts at hand. Although jurors are not expected to explain or justify the verdicts they announce, they must nonetheless swear to decide impartially and \u201caccording to the evidence.\u201d The constraints on judges are even stronger; conceding that, in many cases, several opposing outcomes may each be defensible, judges are still bound (in most systems) to give reasons for their decisions. This reason-giving requirement is a vital facet of judicial integrity and accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In many countries, buying votes from members of the electorate is explicitly prohibited under election law or the criminal code. Mere offers and promises are also banned, as are solicitation and acceptance. Thus, both the offeror and the offeree may be punished. Statutes vary as to the breadth of the prohibition; in Germany, it is illegal to offer or accept \u201cgifts or other benefits,\u201d while the Canada Electoral Act refers specifically to \u201cbribes\u201d and the U.S. federal vote buying statute prohibits \u201cexpenditures.\u201d Notwithstanding these minor differences, the main emphasis of the provisions is the same: it is illegal to pay citizens to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate. While secret balloting generally undermines the effectiveness of the latter tactic (buying votes for a specific candidate), vote buying may nevertheless be effective in encouraging turnout (buying the act of voting generally); the statutes thus cover both types of behaviour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The provisions pertain to payments or benefits conferred on members of the general electorate. A different form of vote buying\u2014namely, purchasing the votes of public officials\u2014is regulated under the law of bribery. In the United States, bribery typically entails five elements: one must corruptly offer a benefit to a public official with the intent to influence the recipient in carrying out an official act. The laws apply also, mutatis mutandis, to the recipient of such a bribe. In other countries, the elements are slightly different, but the common thread is that bribery requires a certain nexus between the benefit conferred by the offeror and the act performed by the recipient in his or her capacity as an agent. Generally, only a quid pro quo exchange will suffice for criminal bribery. A gift given in the mere hope of favourable consideration\u2014but without any expectation thereof\u2014is not a bribe, but may constitute a lesser offense. The most notable difference between countries relates to the timing of the bribe; some jurisdictions consider bribery only to include payment made in respect of future acts, while others explicitly cover both ex ante and ex post facto payments. Nevertheless, among the former jurisdictions, after-the-fact \u201cgratitude payments\u201d are often criminalized as a less serious offense of \u201cunlawful gratuity\u201d or similar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notwithstanding the prohibitions outlined above, there are also many practices that resemble vote buying that are not illegal. Among individual electors, the closest analogue to prohibited vote buying is its payment-in kind manifestation, namely vote trading. In a sense, vote trading is merely a particular subspecies of vote buying; instead of paying for votes with money or favours, vote-traders buy votes with votes. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, individual vote trading is currently protected in the United States on free speech grounds. As long as there is no material benefit changing hands, individual voters may trade their votes as they wish. The same is true for Canada and the United Kingdom (among others), where the legality of vote trading schemes has been upheld by the elections authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a similar vein, the provision of constituent benefits such as \u201cpork\u201d (that is, the allocation of public works projects to a legislator\u2019s geographic constituency) and \u201ccasework\u201d (that is, acting as an intermediary for constituents in dealing with government agencies) can be analogized to vote buying on the part of representatives seeking re-election. Indeed, The de facto \u2018payments\u2019 that accrue to a candidate\u2019s supporters\u2014from patronage, pork, preferential access, and the differential provision of public services\u2014surely dwarf the sorts of compensation voters receive directly for their votes in any of the reported vote-buying schemes. Of course, such practices are a normal and legally permissible aspect of politics; while pork barrel politics may be inefficient in terms of the overall public interest, it is generally tolerated as a means of cementing the \u201celectoral connection\u201d between representatives and their electorates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the legislative context, vote trading (commonly known as \u201clog-rolling\u201d) is a widely acknowledged practice; lawmakers frequently engage in reciprocal \u201cdeal-making\u201d as they deem necessary. Although legislative vote trading meets with greater disapproval in Europe than in the United States, in practice it remains commonplace. Nevertheless, even in the<\/p>\n\n\n\n

United States, the practice is not universally accepted\u2014particularly when it approximates true vote buying by employing budgetary appropriations, and some states prohibit it altogether. Overall, then, legislative vote trading is something of a grey area: frowned upon, but generally tolerated as long as the bargaining remains within the system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Again as to the legislature, lobbying and campaign financing are also worth noting briefly. Both practices are frequently compared to bribery, as they involve the provision of benefits from private entities to public officials in the hope\u2014potentially, at least\u2014of receiving some advantage in return. Of course, in its \u201cpure\u201d form, lobbying is meant to persuade lawmakers on the merits of various policy issues, rather than sway them with material inducements. Still, in recognition of the risk that favours and perks will indeed influence legislators\u2019 votes, the practice is subject to various legal restrictions. Likewise, the dangers of quid pro quo corruption, as well as the possibility that resources will skew the field of political competition, underlie various countries\u2019 limitations on campaign financing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the judiciary, the possibility for vote trading arises when cases come before multi-judge panels, as is the norm in the United States at the appellate level. There seems to be agreement among scholars that \u201cwhile explicit vote trading seems to be shunned in word and deed, a softer form of tacit trading may well be commonplace.\u201d However, the nature of judicial decision making places much stricter limits on the scope of acceptable reciprocity; the type of vote trading behaviour that is conventional in the legislative context would widely be viewed as being inconsistent with the imperatives of judicial integrity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As this very brief overview demonstrates, the bounds between legal and illegal vote buying evince numerous internal tensions, inconsistencies, and even ambiguities. It is not our intention here to engage in a detailed discussion of politics\u2019 dark underbelly; what is important to recognize is simply that, despite explicit vote-buying prohibitions, there remains a substantial realm of questionable behaviour that is permitted even domestically. The question of what should be illegal and what should be permitted does not lend itself to obvious answers; there is legitimate disagreement over where to draw lines. Equally important to recognize, however, is that this disagreement has not obstructed countries from banning at least some forms of vote buying. This fact will be worth bearing in mind when considering the international sphere in Parts IV and V; complexity, dissension, and uncertainty are not uniquely international challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rationales against vote buying or vote selling into five general categories: citizenship, equality, efficiency, reason-giving, and system integrity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the laws on vote buying are contradictory, vague, or over- and under inclusive\u2014as many feel they are\u2014it is likely because the very concept of vote buying is deeply contested. Some observers would like to see bans on peripheral practices such as legislative vote trading, while a few outlying commentators defend even core vote buying as a mode of enhancing efficiency in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, for the most part, our normative intuitions are that vote buying is wrong; the prevalence of legal prohibitions against the practice attests to this fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The practice of vote buying is neither rare nor isolated. One might then ask how international law affects the vote-buying market, if indeed it plays any role at all.  Those conversant in public international law will appreciate already that most international voting is governed by the principle of \u201cone country, one vote.\u201d This system is the norm in the United Nations (notwithstanding the Security Council veto possessed only by the five permanent members) and is implicit in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (\u201cVCLT\u201d), which governs all aspects…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,7,16,12,9,20,3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/722"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=722"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/722\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":723,"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/722\/revisions\/723"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=722"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=722"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/observertimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=722"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}